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STATE V. YOUNG AND THE NEW TEST FOR PRIVACY IN
WASHINGTON
Michael M. Suga
Abstract- In State v. Young, the Washington Supreme Court determined that the
warrantless use of an infrared thermal detection device on the home of a suspected marijuana
grower was a violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. This Note
argues that the court's test for determining privacy rights under Article I, Section 7 is flawed
in form and fails to achieve those goals set forth by the court. It suggests an alternative test for
Article I, Section 7 privacy rights as well as a remedial prerequisite standard of proof in cases
involving minimally intrusive surveillance techniques.
In 1949 George Orwell published his nightmarish novella "1984,"
depicting a world in which a governmental "Big Brother" monitored
every aspect of people's lives.1 Big Brother utilized "thought police"
who were sanctioned to use invasive and oppressive surveillance to
detect illegal thoughts in citizens and punished them for such "thought
crimes." Orwell's work articulated fears that had been felt by people
from all walks of life who, for one reason or another, worried about the
ability of the state to intrude into their private lives.2 This fear of Big
Brother's watchful eye has provoked intense scrutiny of law enforcement
techniques that may intrude on individual privacy regardless of the
importance of the information to police efforts.
At the same time, the fear of crime has remained a major focus of
social concern. With the rise of random violence, gang violence, and
drug-related crimes in the past several decades, government officials
have tried desperately to fashion some solution to this sweeping problem.
These countervailing concerns have created a pitched battle in the
courtrooms of America between advocates of increased privacy
protection from governmental and police intrusions and law enforcement
officials trying to win the war against crime by whatever means available
to them.
Orwell's macabre vision has failed to materialize. Eleven years after
1984, the technology necessary to read people's thoughts has not yet
1. George Orwell, 1984 (1949).
2. The Fourth Amendment reads, in part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause... U.S. Const. amend. IV.
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been developed.3 Nevertheless, a number of technological advances now
allow police to discover things they could not otherivise know. Such
technological or "sense-enhanced" searches that allow law enforcement
officers to sense that which they otherwise would not be able to see,
hear, smell, feel or taste naturally, are the most recent topic over which
Fourth Amendment advocates and law enforcement officials have
battled.
The speed with which new technology is produced and old technology
is improved, as well as the variety of devices that are being developed to
aid police in conducting effective surveillance, make it important for
courts and police to have a workable test for determining the
constitutionality of each new device's warrantless use.4 Furthermore, it is
important that this test strike an appropriate balance between effective
law enforcement and the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment
and its state equivalents. In creating such a test, courts should be ever
mindful of the fact that criminals, like police, are using increasingly
sophisticated and technological methods to make their activities more
efficient and less easily detected.
Federal courts, led by the U.S. Supreme Court, have responded by
creating a single uncomplicated test that, while somewhat amorphous,
can be used to determine when the use of some new piece of technology
requires a warrant and when it does not.5 However, because the U.S.
Constitution provides only the minimum protection thai is to be provided
to citizens, states have been free to find that their own constitutions
provide greater protection against governmental intrusions on individual
privacy. Due to the complexity and concerns about potential abuses,
sense-enhanced searches have been a common area in which states,
including Washington, have opted to provide greater protection.6
Part I of this Note will review the present state of privacy law as it
relates to warrant requirements for sense-enhanced surveillance under
3. The fear of "thought police" through the advancement of psychic sciences was a motivation for
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
4. See State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 184, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (1994).
5. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., conctuing). See also infra part
II.A.
6. For examples of state courts that departed from Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46
(1979) (holding that the use of pen registers to record the telephone number.; called from a particular
telephone did not require a warrant under the Fourth Amendment), to provide greater privacy
protection, see People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135, 144 (Colo. 1983); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d
1162, 1169 (Idaho 1988); State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952, 969 (NJ. 1982).
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both the U.S. Constitution's Fourth Amendment standard7 and the
Washington Constitution Article I, Section 7 standard (art. I, § 7).8 The
focus of this art. I, § 7 analysis will be on the Washington Supreme
Court's most recent ruling on the topic, State v. Young.9 Part II will then
provide a critical analysis of the standard created by Young. Finally, part
I will suggest alternatives to the present art. I, § 7 construction,
providing a more appropriate balance between the privacy rights of
citizens and the ability of police officers to compete with criminals in an
increasingly technological arena.
I. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. The Fourth Amendment "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
and the Right to Privacy Under the U.S. Constitution
Since the introduction of flashlights and binoculars into police
surveillance, courts have been forced to decide when the use of such
technological, sense-enhancing devices constitutes a violation of a
citizen's right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment."° In the last
several decades, federal courts have repeatedly ruled on the use of such
devices, finding the need for a warrant in some cases, while finding other
cases to not require a warrant."
7. Although this Note is directed toward the appropriate standard which should apply to sense-
enhanced searches under Article I, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution, an understanding of
Fourth Amendment rulings and policy are important because they remain at the center of any privacy
analysis and are used by Young and its predecessors as the foundation of art. 1, § 7 privacy analysis.
Furthermore, the body of Fourth Amendment law which has been produced will provide a helpful
reference point in examining the construction of art. I, § 7's privacy analysis.
8. Washington Constitution Article I, § 7 states: "No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." This is Washington's equivalent to the
Fourth Amendment. See supra note 2.
9. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 184, 867 P.2d 593, 599 (1994).
10. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (holding that the warrantless use of a
flashlight by police does not violate Fourth Amendment right to privacy); Fullbright v. United
States, 392 F.2d 432, 434-35 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968) (holding that the
warrantless use of binoculars allowed for surveillance); State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 124, 530
P.2d 306, 309, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975) (holding that the warrrantless use of binoculars
allowed so long as the officer, if he had been closer, could have seen the objects observed).
11. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (holding that the use of
sophisticated photography equipment allowed without a warrant); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 285 (1983) (holding that the use of tracking beeper to follow a car does not require a warrant);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that the use of a device which records
phone numbers dialed from a given phone does not require a warrant); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (holding that the use of a phone tap without a warrant is not allowed).
Washington Law Review
In Katz v. United States,12 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth
Amendment protects a citizen against unwarranted searches and seizures
that intrude upon a reasonable and subjective expectation of privacy. 3 If
one of these conditions is found to be absent, then there is no privacy
interest that is protected by the Fourth Amendment.' 4 Generally
speaking, if there is no protected interest, then the police do not need to
obtain a warrant based on probable cause, nor do they need any
prerequisite level of suspicion to conduct their surveillmce, as any such
surveillance would be outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment.'5
Courts have used a variety of considerations to determine whether or
not a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, including: the nature of
the search, the location of the officers, the nature of the property on
which the search occurs, the information-gathering capabilities of a
technique, and the activities observed.' 6 Under the protected places
doctrine, which was an integral part of Fourth Amendment law prior to
Katz, any manner of physical penetration of a home constituted a per se
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 7 Katz's reasonable and subjective
expectation of privacy test, however, abolished the previously
maintained "protected places" doctrine of Fourth Amendment rights.'
Thus, under Katz, the fact that a surveillance techniqu,- is focused on a
private residence is not determinative of a violation under the Fourth
Amendment. 9 Nevertheless, as Justice Harlan noted in his concurrence,
people reasonably expect more privacy in their homes than elsewhere.20
In cases pre-dating Katz and State v. Myrick,2' the case which
abolished the protected places doctrine in Washington, the protected
places doctrine took on an extremely simple form. If there was a physical
penetration of a place that the court determined deserved special
protection, most commonly a home, then there was a per se
12. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
13. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although part of a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan's
language has been commonly accepted as the test created by Katz. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740.
14. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280-81.
15. Id. at 285.
16. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206,211 (1966).
17. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
18. Id. at 353 (stating that "the Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas'-
against unreasonable searches and seizures").
19. Id. at 351.
20. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
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constitutional violation.' On the other hand, if no such penetration took
place, then there was no violation.' In rejecting the protected places
doctrine, however, the Katz and Myrick courts were not simply finding
fault with the mechanics of the rule, but they were finding fault with the
idea behind the rule. In overruling prior cases that used the protected
places rule, the Court in Katz declared that the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.24 This simply means that places in and of
themselves confer no rights or privileges.' Instead, it is the privacy that
we reasonably expect in certain places that provides protection to
activities and information related to those places.
B. Article I, Section 7 and Washington State's Departure from Fourth
Amendment Privacy Rights
More than a decade ago, in State v. Ringer,26 the Washington Supreme
Court stated that art. I, § 7 is not merely a reflection of the Fourth
Amendment, but rather, it incorporates the principles of privacy as they
have been developed in Washington's common law since the adoption of
its constitution." In Ringer, the court used this notion to find that a
search under art. I, § 7 must be considered under Washington's common
law as it was adopted by the Constitutional Convention in 1889.8 The
Ringer court noted that the Constitutional Convention deliberately chose
different language than that contained in the Fourth Amendment.29
In a series of decisions, the Washington Supreme Court articulated the
difference between art. I, § 7 and the Fourth Amendment. First, in State
22. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 352-53.
23. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (finding that there was no
violation based on the fact that, while tapping phone lines, the police never physically entered or
penetrated Olmstead's home).
24. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
25. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 213 (1966) (finding that, when a person turns his or
her home into a place from which to conduct an illegal drug business, the home loses its sanctity and
becomes no more private than a street corner).
26. 100 Wash. 2d 686,674 P.2d 1240 (1983).
27. Id. at 691,674 P.2d at 1243.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 690, 674 P.2d at 1243. See also State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 179, 867 P.2d 593,
596 (1994). The Young court established that, in accordance with State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d
54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), there is a sufficient difference between the wording of art. I, § 7 and the
Fourth Amendment, as well as sufficient evidence of the state Constitutional Convention's intent, to
warrant greater protection of privacy rights under art. I, § 7 than that provided by the Fourth
Amendment.
Washington Law Review
v. Chrisman,3° the court held that art. I, § 7 provides greater protection
than that provided by the Fourth Amendment.3 The Chrisman court did
not delineate the boundaries of this heightened protection, holding
instead that an examination of facts on a case-by-case basis is preferable
to a bright-line rule in the determination of when police activities violate
constitutional standards. 2
Myrick provided a more developed discussion of the protection
afforded under art. I, § 7.33 According to Myrick, determining when a
violation of art. I, § 7 has occurred turns on whether the state has
unreasonably intruded into a person's private affairs." Myrick clarified
the difference between art. I, § 7 and the Fourth Amendment by finding
that protection under art. I, § 7 is not limited by the Fourth Amendment's
subjective expectation requirement." Thus, after Chrisman and Myrick,
art. I, § 7 was interpreted to provide heightened p.ivacy protection
similar to that provided under the Fourth Amendment, but without the
requirement of a subjective expectation of privacy.36
C. State v. Young: The New Test for Privacy Rights Under Article I,
Section 7
State v. Young37 is the Washington Supreme Court's latest decision on
the constitutionality of sense-enhanced searches. According to Young,
there are two separate areas, "private affairs" and "invasions of the
home," where the Washington Constitution provides greater protection
than the Fourth Amendment.38 In Young, the court held that the use of a
thermal detection device constitutes a search requiring a warrant under
30. 100 Wash. 2d 814,676 P.2d419 (1984).
31. Id. at 818, 676 P.2d at 422.
32. Id. at 820, 676 P.2d at 423.
33. State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984).
34. Id. at 510, 688 P.2d at 153-54.
35. The Myrick court concluded that: "Const. art. I, § 7 analysis encompasses those legitimate
privacy expectations protected by the Fourth Amendment, but is not confined to the subjective
privacy expectations of modem citizens who, due to well publicized advances in surveillance
technology, are learning to expect diminished privacy in many aspects of their lives." Id. at 510-11,
688 P.2d at 154.
36. See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 159, 720 P.2d 436, 445 (1986) (Durham, J.,
concurring).
37. 123 Wash. 2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994).
38. Id. at 181, 184, 867 P.2d at 597,599.
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art. I, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution.39 The court reached this
conclusion by first finding that the device's use constituted an
unreasonable intrusion into the defendant's private affairs.4" The court
also held that the search constituted a separate violation of art. I, § 7
under an invasion of the home analysis and, finally, that it violated the
Fourth Amendment as well. 41 The dual analysis provided by Young
represents the most detailed art. I, § 7 test that the Washington Supreme
Court has fashioned to date.
1. State v. Young: The Facts
On August 14, 1990, Edmonds police received an anonymous note
stating that Robert Young had a marijuana grow operation in his house.42
A follow-up investigation verified Young's address and phone number
included in the note.43 At the home, the investigating detective noticed
that the basement windows were constantly covered, and that there was
no detectable odor of marijuana." The detective obtained the power
consumption records for Young's home and found that there was an
39. Id. at 184, 867 P.2d at 599. A thermal detection device is a hand-held device which, at night,
detects the heat emitted from the surface of objects targeted and transforms the data into a visual
image. In the image displayed, white colors denote cool areas, and darker shades of gray denote
increasing levels of heat. The device sends no rays into the object targeted, nor does the reading
directly represent internal temperatures. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 223,
aff'd on other grounds, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1994).
40. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 184, 867 P.2d at 599.
41. Id. at 188, 867 P.2d at 601. According to Young, its analysis regarding the Fourth Amendment
is undertaken to provide "guidance" to courts faced with this issue in the future. Id. However, the
district court in United States v. Domitrovich, 852 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (E.D. Wash. 1994), declined
to follow the Young decision, choosing instead to follow Penny-Feeney. In Domitrovich, the court
stated that "the [Young] Court's ruling was based (in no small part) upon generalizations regarding
potential invasions of privacy." 852 F. Supp at 1474 n.2. Domitrovich noted that a proper Fourth
Amendment analysis concentrates instead on "the facts of each case, not . . . extravagant
generalizations." Id. at 1474. A number of circuits likewise have found that use of thermal imaging
does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 851 (5th Cir.
1995); United States v. Meyers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d
992,995-97 (1 lth Cir. 1994); United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1993).
42. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 176-77, 867 P.2d at 595. The phrase "marijuana grow operation"
refers to an illegal operation in which persons use sun lamps (similar to those used for in-home sun
tanning) to grow marijuana plants indoors. See, e.g., State v. Solberg, 122 Wash. 2d 688, 691, 831
P.2d 754,755-56 (1994).
43. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 177, 867 P.2d at 595.
44. Id. Because marijuana grow operations commonly are located within a private home or
garage, growers commonly cover windows or grow the plants in places without windows to make
standard visual detection of such operations impossible. See, e.g., Solberg, 122 Wash. 2d at 691, 831
P.2d at 755-56.
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increased rate of power consumption consistent with marijuana grow
operations for the past three years.4'
It was at this point, when the gathered evidence strongly suggested a
marijuana grow operation, that the police decided to use a thermal
detection device to verify their suspicions. The device revealed that
Young's house displayed abnormal heating patterns involving unusual
warmth emanating from the foundation.' For the purpose of comparison,
a number of neighboring houses were scanned with the device as well.47
Based on the data acquired by the police using the thermal detection
device, a search warrant was obtained.48 Edmonds Police served the
warrant on August 28, 1990, and a quantity of marijuana was
discovered.49 Young was charged with possession of marijuana with
intent to manufacture or deliver and was found guilty on July 15, 1991 50
Appeal to the Washington Supreme Court was direct."'
2. State v. Young: The Reasoning of the Court
The Young court began by re-establishing that avt. I, § 7 affords
citizens greater protection against governmental searches and
surveillance than the Fourth Amendment. The court seems to have
focused on the specific language of art. I, § 7 lo find that the
Constitutional Convention's choice of the phrases "private affairs" and
"home invaded" provides greater protection in these two distinct areas. 3
Therefore, the court analyzed each of the provisions separately and
created a two-part test for determining violations of art. 1, § 7: first under
the private affairs clause,54 and then under a property-based analysis for
the home invaded clause.55
45. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 177, 867 P.2d at 595. The increase in power consumption is caused
by the constant running of multiple sun lamps. It is possible for marijuana grow operators to render
power consumption searches ineffective by tampering with home electric me:ers. See Penny-Feeney,
773 F. Supp. at 224.
46. Young, 123 Wash. 2d. at 178, 867 P.2d at 595.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 179, 867 P.2d at 596. See also supra part I.C.
53. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 184-85, 867 P.2d at 599. See also supra note S.
54. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 181, 867 P.2d at 597.
55. Id. at 184, 867 P.2d at 599.
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a. The Two-Part Private Affairs Analysis
According to Young, the private affairs inquiry begins with a question
of whether a search has occurred. 6 If it is determined that a search has
occurred, a warrant is necessary to prevent an art. I, § 7 violation." On
the other hand, if there was no search, then no warrant is required, and
art. I, § 7 privacy rights are not implicated. 8 Whether or not a search had
occurred depends upon whether there has been an unreasonable intrusion
into a person's private affairs." In determining whether or not such an
intrusion has occurred, the court preserved under art. I, § 7 many of the
principles which existed as the basis for Fourth Amendment protection.'
Therefore, the court suggested that the plain view doctrine described in
past decisions is a product of the private affairs clause of art. I, § 7.61
Similarly, the notion that things knowingly exposed to the public are not
protected is retained under the court's private affairs analysis.62
Most of the court's analysis, however, focused on a two-part test that
the court fashioned from prior decisions.63 First, in determining whether
or not there was a violation of the private affairs clause, the court asked
if there was a "substantial and unreasonable departure from a lawful
vantage point."'  Second, the court asked whether there was a
"particularly intrusive method of viewing."'65 According to the court, if
the answer to either of these questions was yes, then the activity might
constitute a search.6 In determining that the use of thermal imaging
devices violates the second prong of this test, the court looked at the
intrusiveness of the surveillance technique and the nature of the property
56. Id. at 181, 867 P.2d at 597.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 182, 867 P.2d at 597.
61. Id. The plain view doctrine states that objects which are in plain view of an officer who is
viewing from a legal vantage point are subject to search and seizure without a warrant. State v.
Kennedy, 107 Wash. 2d 1, 9, 726 P.2d 445,450 (1986).
62. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 182, 867 P.2d at 597. Related to the plain view doctrine, the
knowingly exposed doctrine denies privacy protection to those activities knowingly exposed to the
public. State v. Meyers, 117 Wash. 2d 332,345, 815 P.2d 761,769 (1991).
63. The court cited Meyers, 117 Wash. 2d 332, 815 P.2d 761, and State v. Seagull, 95 Wash. 2d
898, 632 P.2d 44 (1981), as the cases which first suggested this test. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 181-
82, 867 P.2d at 597.
64. Id. at 182-83, 867 P.2d at 598.
65. Id.
66. Id. The court never clarified when failing one branch of this test might not constitute a
violation of art. I, § 7.
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being observed.67 While considering how intrusive the surveillance
technique was, the court determined that the thermal imaging device
goes well beyond an enhancement of natural senses, allowing police to
detect heat patterns that are otherwise undetectable. The court also
emphasized that the device allowed police to conduct heir surveillance
without the subject's knowledge. 9
The Young court continued by discussing how th.e nature of the
property viewed was also a factor in whether the surveillance violated
the subject's right of privacy." The court concluded that the device
allowed the officers to draw specific inferences about the inside of the
house.71 These inferences included what rooms a homeowner is heating,
where major heat-producing appliances are, and "poSsibly" even the
number of people staying at the residence on a given night.72 From this
information, the court felt that the police could further infer how
financially able the homeowner is to heat his or her home.73 Finally, the
court stated that because the activities that were inferable from the
device's use occurred within a home, they fell within those private affairs
that are protected under art. I, § 7.74 Based upon these facts, the court
concluded that the thermal detection device represented a particularly
intrusive means of surveillance requiring a warrant before use.75
b. The Property-Based Invasion of the Home Analysis
Although the court already considered the nature of the property as
relevant to its private affairs analysis, it nevertheless went on to make a
separate analysis of the heightened privacy protection afforded to homes
under art. I, § 7. The court maintained that the private affairs and the
invasion of the home bases for protection are distinct concepts and
should be considered separately, despite the occasional overlap.76
Contrary to its private affairs analysis, however, the court did not create a
67. Id. at 183, 867 P.2d at 598. The court concluded that the police conducted the surveillance
from a legal vantage point Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 183-84, 867 P.2d at 598.
73. Id. at 183, 867 P.2d at 598.
74. Id. at 184, 867 P.2d at 598.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 184-85, 867 P.2d at 599.
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structured test to guide lower courts through an invasion of the home
analysis. Instead, the court stated the guiding principle that the home is
an especially private place requiring greater constitutional protection." In
reaching this conclusion, however, the court was quick to point out that
this augmented constitutional protection did not rise to the level of the
protected places doctrine abolished by the court in State v. Myrick.78
Although it did not clarify what the test was to be under the invasion
of the home analysis of art. I, § 7, the court found an unconstitutional
invasion of the home in Young because the thermal imaging device
gathered information about the interior of the house that could not be
seen by the naked eye.79 According to Young, the device effectively
allowed police to see through the walls of the house, thereby invading
the home for purposes of art. I, § 7.8" Young declared that such invasions
of the home are unconstitutional unless a warrant is first obtained, or the
State can make an extraordinary showing of need. The court, in
justifying its result, noted its fear that the use of such surveillance
techniques, unchecked by a warrant requirement, would act to "chill free
expression.""
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON'S ARTICLE I,
SECTION 7 RIGHT TO PRIVACY AFTER YOUNG
A number of problems arise from the standard for art. I, § 7 protection
created by the court in Young. First, the court set a dangerous precedent
by using speculative inferences in its discussion of the information-
gathering abilities of the thermal imaging device used in the case. This
break with traditional privacy protection analysis could mark the demise
of any useful open view surveillance if taken to its natural extreme. Next,
the court revived the protected places doctrine in a new form. While
Young does not reestablish the physical penetration doctrine of Olmstead
v. United States,82 it nonetheless abandons the spirit behind the decisions
in Katz v. United States83 and Myrick, that protection is to be provided to
77. Id. at 185, 867 P.2d at 599.
78. Id. at 185 n.2, 867 P.2d at 599 n.2 (citing Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)).
79. Id. at 186,867 P.2d at 599.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 187, 867 P.2d at 600. The court failed to further explain the connection between privacy
and free expression.
82. 227 U.S. 438 (1928). See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
83. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
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people, not places." Finally, the court's departure from Iraditional Fourth
Amendment analysis of sense-enhanced searches failed to provide an
administratively workable model for lower courts to use as guidance
under art. I, § 7 in determining the legality of the warrantless use of
future technological surveillance techniques.
A. Young's Use oflnferences in Its "Private Affairs" Analysis Closes
the Door on Future Sense-Enhanced Warrantless Surveillance
According to Young, the intrusiveness of a surveillance method is
determined in part by looking at the means employed." While the court
characterized the information-gathering capabilities of the thermal
imaging device as allowing the officers to effectively see through the
walls of Young's home, it failed to precisely distinguish between the
primary information police officers received from the thermal imaging
device and the inferences attributed to such primary information by the
court. The court explained that the thermal imaging device detected that
there were warm spots on the foundation of the home, that the lower
portion of the chimney was warm but that the top was cool, and that only
one of the two chimney vents was warm.86
However, the court's holding that the procedure violated art. I, § 7
was not based on the heating patterns themselves. Instead, the court
relied on the police officer's ability to use this information to draw
probing inferences about the inside of the house.87 Therefore, the Young
court supplemented the primary data gathered by police with its own
opinion of what facts the police might have been able to infer from the
data they had gathered. It is unclear how far the Washington Supreme
Court is willing to stretch this imputation of inferable knowledge to those
conducting surveillance.
The inferences that the court focused on in Young suggest that it is
acceptable to stretch such inferences as far as a court's imagination will
allow. The court's determination that a short thermal scan such as the
one involved in Young could allow police to determine the family's
ability to heat certain rooms is highly questionable. The possible reasons
why a room or even an entire home might be left cool range from
personal taste to vacancy. Additionally, because the device detects heat
coming off of a home's surface, a cool zone might simply represent
84. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
85. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 183, 867 P.2d at 598.
86. Id. at 177-78, 867 P.2d at 595.
87. Id. at 183-84, 867 P.2d at 598. See also supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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efficient insulation. In addition, any inference as to the financial ability
of homeowners to heat their homes would be similarly questionable.88
Even less clear is how the court came to the conclusion that heat patterns
allow police to determine the number of people in a home at any given
time.89 Nevertheless, based almost entirely on facts that were
questionably inferable from the thermal imaging device's data, the court
found that the use of a thermal imaging device was "particularly
intrusive" enough to constitute a search requiring a warrant."
When determining the intrusiveness of a particular surveillance
technique, there is no question that courts must consider the range of
potential information that the technique will allow police to discover.91
Courts must not be allowed, however, to permit broad speculation based
on the primary information discovered to preclude the use of valuable
surveillance techniques. The only limit on such a practice would be the
imagination of the judge making the determination. To allow such
speculation to guide the intrusiveness analysis would lead to patently
absurd results, and the delicate balance between effective law
enforcement and privacy rights would be severely impaired.
88. A homeowner's financial ability to pay also might be inferred from the exterior of the home,
making related information inferred from the sense-enhancing thermal detection device harmless.
89. The court later noted that a person pressed against a thin plywood door, or pressed against a
curtained window might be directly detected by the device. Young 123 Wash. 2d at 193, 867 P.2d at
603. If this is the case, then only if all of the home's occupants pressed against thin plywood doors
or curtained windows, would it be possible for police to determine the number of occupants without
counting them as they entered.
90. The court also found the fact that the surveillance could occur without the subject's
knowledge to be a factor in determining the intrusiveness of the thermal detection device. Id. at 183,
867 P.2d at 598. This argument is indicative of the court's fear of governmental abuse. The court
further found the fact that the officers also scanned other houses in the neighborhood for comparison
disturbing, stating: "If we were to hold the use of the device does not constitute a search, no
limitation would be placed on the government's ability to use the device on any private residence, on
any particular night, even if no criminal activity is suspected." Id. at 187, 867 P.2d at 600. However,
this same notion was posed by the respondent in United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983), to
which the court responded. "[I]f such dragnet type law enforcement practices as respondent
envisions should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable" Id. at 284.
91. The Supreme Court rejected the practice of looking only at the data actually gathered by
police in a particular instance in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967). The Katz Court
asserted that courts must also look at what could have been discovered by using the device (a
telephone wiretap) because limitations on surveillance must not be result-based, or within the
discretion of police. Id.
919
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B. The "Home Invaded" Clause as Understood by the Court Marks
the Rebirth of the Protected Places Doctrine in a New, More
Powerful Form
By creating an independent home invasion violation of art. I, § 7, the
Young court essentially created its own version of the protected places
doctrine. The court's "invasion of the home" analysis and the "nature of
the property" branch of its private affairs analysis both focus on the fact
that a home was the subject of the surveillance, and suggest that as a
result of the special nature of the home, the technique is overly intrusive
and deserves constitutional protection.92 The court precluded the
possibility that the invasion of the home analysis is merely a redundant
reconsideration of the nature of the property observed doctrine by stating
that the two analyses are conceptually distinct.93 This insistence that the
two analyses are distinct suggests that within the invasion of the home
analysis, the nature of the property observed has some additional
significance beyond that already taken into account by the private affairs
analysis. Granting such talismanic significance to homes, however,
mirrors closely the protected places doctrine explicitly rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court in Katz and
Myrick, respectively.
When the U.S. Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court
rejected the protected places doctrine, they stated that the Fourth
Amendment and art. I, § 7 protect people, not places.94 Despite the
Washington court's adoption of this view in Myrick, the Young court
failed to provide any facts, other than the fact that it was a house that was
subjected to the surveillance, to support its classification of the subject
matter as within the scope of the "home invaded" clause.95 The only fact
that the court seemed to discuss within its substantive analysis was that
the search effectively allowed police to know things about the inside of
Young's home that they otherwise would not have known.96 Thus, the
92. Both sections deal with the generally private nature of people's homes and both decisions turn
on the fact that the court felt the police were able, in effect, to see through the walls of Young's
house.
93. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
95. The court even went so far as to suggest that a narcotics dog sniff may be unconstitutional
under art. I, § 7 if the object of the search or the location of the search was a home. Such searches,
however, have never been deemed to rise to the level of a protected search because the only
information that can be gathered by their use is the presence of an illegal substance. Young, 123
Wash. 2d at 194, 867 P.2d at 603-04. It is unclear how, after saying this, the court can still contend
that the "protected places" doctrine is abolished.
96. Id. at 183, 867 P.2d at 598.
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only fact noted by the court in determining that invasion of the home
protection was appropriate was that which, by rejecting protected places,
it claimed was insufficient to warrant automatic privacy protection.
By focusing exclusively on the nature of the property observed, the
Young court's home invasion analysis essentially resurrects a more
powerful version of the protected places doctrine in that it requires no
physical penetration of a home to trigger protection.97 Under the court's
analysis, even mundane and innocuous pieces of information that might
be inadvertently discovered will invalidate valuable police surveillance
merely because of the fact that the information is related to a private
residence. After Young, for example, information about the heating of a
home, and possibly the location of certain appliances within the home,
will trigger art. I, § 7 protection. As Justice Harlan suggested in his
concurring opinion in Katz, the fact that the information relates to a
private residence should bear only upon the invasiveness of the search to
the extent that it reflects the naturally private nature of such places.98
C. The Divided Test Created in Young Fails to Provide Lower Courts
and Law Enforcement Officials with the Proper Guidance of an
Understandable Test
The Young court declared that it would not create a right to privacy
that depends on the ever-changing state of technology, stating that such a
right would be administratively unworkable.99 The court stated its
concern that, if such a broadly defined right was created, law
enforcement agents, and presumably lower courts as well, would not
have an adequately defined test to know what is to be allowed and what
is not.'" Apart from the substantive difficulties of the test created by the
Young court the test itself is administratively unworkable.
By dividing the analysis under art. I, § 7 into two distinct parts, but
failing to distinguish these two analyses, the Young court has left lower
courts unable to accurately determine when a situation falls under one
test or the other. Because both clauses may sometimes apply, it is
necessary to distinguish between the two parts of the test. The court,
however, failed to adequately make this distinction. Also, the question
remains whether or not the court intended art. I, § 7 to provide
97. The protected places doctrine created in Young admittedly is limited to homes rather than the
nonspecific private places conceivable under the old doctrine.
98. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
99. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 184, 867 P.2d at 598.
100. Id.
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heightened protection in all areas traditionally covered by Fourth
Amendment search and seizure law, or just in those instances involving
"private affairs" and "invasions of the home." That is, it is unclear
whether there will be cases in which neither clause is appropriate and
that Fourth Amendment rights should instead be applied. The failure of
the court to definitively state what constitutes a "private affair" or an
"invasion of the home" makes the comprehension of such issues murky
at best. Finally, the court's sanction of the use of inferences in
determining the invasiveness of technological surveillance techniques
opens a door without defining any limits. Barring the imited examples
provided in Young itself, lower courts cannot know, nor can police
officers in the field be expected to guess, which inferences are
appropriate and which go too far.
I. ALTERNATIVES
A. Refocusing the Privacy Analysis
In an attempt to create an administratively workable test for privacy
rights, the court in Young sacrificed the simplicity of the federal test for a
more complex, yet bright-line rule. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in
Rakas v. United States,"°1 however, rights against unreasonable search
and seizure are of such a nature that bright-line rules zxe inappropriate.
While such bright-line rules may be simpler to state and to apply, they
fail because such rights are not so simply defined. What is private and
what is to be protected are extremely fact-specific considerations. In
determining when such rights adhere, a court must consider the totality
of the circumstances."~
The private affairs analysis in Young is essentially the same type of
analysis that both federal and Washington state courts have made under
the Katz test. The Young court determined that, due to the private nature
of those activities that occur in a person's home, any search that
significantly infringes upon such privacy violates a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The court gained nothing by employing an
analytical dichotomy under the "private affairs" and "home invaded"
clauses of art. I, § 7.
The Washington Supreme Court should return to the state of
Washington privacy law that arguably existed after Myrick. Under such
an art. I, § 7 construction, courts would make their own determinations
101. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
102. See id. at 147-48.
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under the reasonable expectation of privacy test without considering the
subjective expectations of individuals, as is required under the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, while Washington courts may provide greater
protection under art. I, § 7, they still can draw as much as they wish from
persuasive federal analysis and opinions. Furthermore, strict guidelines
as to when something should fall within one category of privacy or
another would be unnecessary as all considerations would be considered
within a single analysis based on the reasonableness of the expectation of
privacy.
This proposed analysis is consistent with the well-established holding
that the Washington State Constitution provides greater protection than
the Fourth Amendment. This additional protection would simply be
characterized in a way that comports with the basic principles of privacy
as established in Katz and adopted by the Washington courts. Thus, even
in circumstances that qualify as a subject's private affairs or that
constitute invasions of the home, the test should remain the subject's
reasonable expectation of privacy. Under the suggested approach to
privacy rights, the additional protection guaranteed in art. I, § 7 would
manifest itself as allowing a higher level of "reasonable" expectation.
The choice of language by the State Constitutional Convention would
simply state a truism under art. I, § 7: that Washington residents
reasonably expect a great deal of privacy in their home and private
affairs.
In the context of a reasonableness test for art. I, § 7 protection, the
analysis of facts would be case specific. In each instance, the capabilities
of a given surveillance technique would be considered. This analysis,
instead of focusing on those thresholds maintained by the protected
places doctrine, would focus on actual privacy interests involved and
their reasonableness. Furthermore, in considering the use of each
surveillance technique, the analysis would be limited to the primary data
obtained and reasonable conclusions that could be derived from them,
rather than allowing unlikely inferences to act as determinative facts.
B. Two Levels of Privacy
Another beneficial change to the Young test for art.I, § 7 privacy
would be to require a showing less stringent than probable cause to
validate the use of minimally intrusive surveillance techniques. Such an
approach, used by the Washington Supreme Court in In re Rosier,"°3
103. 105 Wash. 2d 606, 615,717 P.2d 1353, 1359 (1986). This case involved the ability of public
officials to get the names, addresses, and electrical usage of the power company's customers in their
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would provide greater flexibility both to courts and law enforcement
officials, while adequately protecting legitimate privacy interests.
Washington courts still tend to hold that a search or surveillance
technique either requires a warrant, or that it requires nothing at all.
Under this black-and-white approach, there is no flexibility to allow
courts to find that certain surveillance techniques are minimally intrusive
or reveal limited information. Without such a middle ground, courts are
forced either to limit the usefulness of minimally intrusive techniques by
demanding warrants, or to allow them to be used without any supervision
at all, thereby leaving the door open for those abuses that the court tried
to prevent in Young. Within the last three decades, the U.S. Supreme
Court and the Washington Supreme Court have shown rare instances of
flexibility in this area that reject an all-or-nothing analysis."° Within
such decisions lies a logical and more reasonable way to look at
constitutional privacy.
One way to create a privacy right that is more sensitive to the specific
facts of a search technique would be to require police, in certain
situations, to have a documented suspicion of illegal conduct before
conducting a search. The court previously used this technique to resolve
a borderline privacy rights issue. In Rosier, the Washington Supreme
Court noted that individuals have a significant privacy interest in the
distribution of their electricity consumption records.' Rather than
finding that police could not gain access to such records without a
warrant, however, the court required that police articulate to the power
company a "specific suspicion of particular illegal conduct."' 6
The method approved by the court in Rosier essentially matches a
new, less intrusive level of search with a less stringent version of the
probable cause warrant requirement. Under this model, officers wishing
to conduct a borderline search would be required to file a written
description of their basis for suspicion as well as an explanation of how
the search would aid in affirming or contradicting that suspicion. This
approach would allow police to conduct progressive investigations in
which they could, with minimal intrusion into the private affairs of
official capacities. Although this case did not deal specifically with the issue of police use of such
records to track down marijuana grow operations, the court specifically addressed this issue as a
likely extension of the general issue.
104. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968) (criticizing "rigid al-or-nothing" models in
the area of Fourth Amendment search and seizure law).
105. Rosier, 105 Wash, 2d at 613,717 P.2d at 1358.
106. Id. at 615, 717 P.2d at 1359.
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suspected individuals, build their case and acquire the evidence
necessary to get a warrant to search or arrest.
The marijuana grow operation at issue in Young is a good example of
how this alternative procedure could work. In Washington, for police to
obtain a warrant to search a home for a marijuana grow operation, they
must have either a proven reliable confidential informant, or a
combination of a less reliable tip and a positive identification by police
of the distinctive smell produced by such operations. 7 Warrants are
frequently denied, even in cases in which police have a tip, power
records indicating an operation, and other indicia such as "sweaty" or
covered windows.0 8 Because adequate ventilation can make the scent
undetectable to police outside the home, it often is difficult for police
who have other strong indications of a grow operation to get the probable
cause demanded of them."° Under the Rosier alternative approach, police
who could build a reasonable case against a subject would be allowed to
use the thermal imaging device to get over the hump and obtain the
probable cause necessary for a full search warrant with only a limited
intrusion into the suspect's privacy.
Under this proposed approach, a trial judge finding that a method of
observation constituted some level of a search would not have to exclude
the evidence. If the court determined first that the search was conducted
in the least intrusive manner, and second, that the information-gathering
capabilities were sufficiently innocuous, the judge could determine that,
given a valid suspicion, there was no violation of the right to privacy."0
This analysis essentially would be a determination under the reasonable
expectation of privacy test illustrated above."'
Under this method, all of the court's concerns regarding abuse by
police would be effectively resolved. Just as in Rosier, the practice of
documenting a valid suspicion would sufficiently protect against "fishing
expeditions.. '"2 The defendant could, at trial, challenge the existence of
such a suspicion, and the state would then be forced to defend the
truthfulness of the officer's suspicion."' In the event that the suspicion
107. Conversation with King County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Tami Perdue, April 11, 1995
(notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d at 614-15, 717 P.2d at 1359.
111. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
112. See Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d at 615, 717 P.2d at 1359.
113. Seeid.
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was based upon the word of a secret informant, the judge could examine
such evidence or testimony by the informant in camera fbr sufficiency." 4
If the Washington Supreme Court fails to follow the model suggested
above, the same result could be reached through statutory reform. Just
after the court's decision in Rosier, the Washington Legislature enacted
RCW § 42.17.314 regarding police requests for electrical utility
records."5 This statute was simply a statutory restatement of the court's
holding that, prior to inspecting electricity records of individuals, an
officer must first submit to the electric company a written statement
articulating suspicion and stating that the electricity records will help
determine if such suspicions are true." 6 Accordingly, the Legislature
could enact similar statutes for the use of devices such as the thermal
imaging device. Such a statute could simply be a restatement of the
common law principles drawn from Rosier and applied to the thermal
device." 7 The failure of the courts to strike down RCW § 42.17.314
suggests that this approach is an acceptable resolution of the
constitutional issues raised by Rosier.
The drawback of this statutory technique is twofol.d. First, without
prompting by the courts, the time lag between the development of a new,
minimally intrusive surveillance technique and legislative action will be
great. Second, the courts, which are more closely involved with police
efforts, are in a better position to monitor the advances in technological
surveillance and their subsequent applications. Therefore, ultimately, a
common law solution is preferable.
114. See State v. Casal, 103 Wash. 2d 812, 820-22, 699 P.2d 1234, 1239-40 (1985).
115. Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.314 reads:
A law enforcement authority may not request inspection or copying of records of any person,
which belong to a public utility district or a municipally owned electriral utility, unless the
authority provides the public utility district or municipally owned electrical utility with a written
statement in which the authority states that it suspects that the particular person to whom the
records pertain has committed a crime and the authority has a reasonable ,elief that the records
could determine or help determine whether the suspicion might be true. Information obtained in
violation of this rule is inadmissible in any criminal proceeding.
116. Rosier, 105 Wash. 2d at 614-15,717 P.2d at 1359.
117. The statute might read:
A law enforcement authority may not conduct, order another to conduct, or inspect the results of
a thermal imaging of an individual's home or place of business, unless the authority first
submits to the court a written statement in which the authority states that it suspects that the
particular person who works or resides in such home or place of business has committed a crime
and the authority has a reasonable belief that the thermal imaging cottd determine or help
determine whether the suspicion might be true. Information obtained in violation of this rule is
inadmissible in any criminal proceeding.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The construction of art. I, § 7 created by the Washington Supreme
Court in State v. Young fails to supply the structure necessary for lower
courts and law enforcement officers to determine the constitutionality of
new search techniques. The court's establishment of a bright-line rule for
all technological sense-enhanced searches will result in confusion and
the re-emergence of the protected places doctrine. Finally, by allowing
for the use of questionable inferences when determining the information
gathering capability of a surveillance technique, the court unnecessarily
limits the future use of sense-enhanced search technology.
The court should abandon this model of privacy rights in Washington
in favor of a modified Fourth Amendment "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test. Ultimately, such a switch will preserve the heightened
protection of privacy under art. I, § 7 without recreating the protected
places doctrine. The court should also allow lower courts to broadly
apply the solution arrived at in Rosier. By allowing courts an
intermediate option for privacy problems, the court could in many
instances increase the accountability of police for the surveillance they
conduct. At other times, this approach would allow police greater
freedom to responsibly conduct investigations necessary to obtain search
warrants. Such investigations could uncover vital but relatively
innocuous information without violating art. I, § 7. Adopting these
alternatives would provide a more efficient protection of individual
privacy rights in the spirit of the Fourth Amendment rather than
sacrificing the tools of law enforcement to the spirit of George Orwell.

